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BETWEEN MITIGATION AND DRAMATIZATION:  




This chapter addresses the general research questions of the book, namely the possibility that 
populists in Europe can profit from a peculiar crisis such as COVID-19, and it wonders whether 
populists reacted in a similar way across countries or whether the institutional role they play at the 
national level has affected their reactions. Findings show that while populists have tried to take 
advantage of the crisis situation, the impossibility of taking ownership of the COVID-19 issue has 
made the crisis hard to be exploited. In particular, populists in power have tried to depoliticize the 
pandemic, whereas radical right-populists in opposition tried to politicize the crisis without gaining 
relevant public support though. 
 
 
GIULIANO BOBBA, University of Turin (giuliano.bobba@unito.it) 
NICOLAS HUBÉ, University of Lorraine 
 
It is generally believed that populists benefit from crisis situations. However, the COVID-19 health 
crisis is an unconventional event that, at the time of writing this conclusion, is far from being under 
control. The general research question addressed by this book relates to the possibility that populists 
in Europe are profiting from a peculiar crisis such as COVID-19, gaining centrality in the political 
field and/or using the crisis to push forward new opposition lines (RQ1). A second, related, question 
has tried to pinpoint whether populists reacted in a similar way across countries or whether they 
adapted their response according to their institutional role - in power or not (RQ2). Findings show 
that while populists have tried to take advantage of the crisis situation, the impossibility of taking 




1. Who has benefited from the crisis? Citizens’ support, public relevance, and windows of 
opportunity 
There is a priori no political purpose to, or direct responsibility for the origin of the pandemic. 
Contrary to previous European crises (i.e. financial and migrant), the causes are accidental, and 
determined by unintended and unguided shocks. These accidents are difficult to politicize since they 
are caused by ‘events beyond human control’. For this issue, the process of politicization is therefore 
more complex, since causal attribution of responsibility is not always possible and unambiguous 
(Stone, 1989). In addition, governments have tried to manage the COVID-19 crisis as a non-political 
and science-based task, steering the problem away from intentional cause and pushing it toward the 
realm of nature. Public awareness of the problem in a ‘high-choice media environment’ (Van Aelst 
et al., 2017) has made citizens highly informed and given them a means of scanning the evolution of 
the pandemic in the same way as governments. Transparency and (rational) explanations of 
governmental decisions have thus been demanded loudly by public opinion throughout Europe. 
In the eight European cases analysed in this book, it has been a fact that governments have taken 
similar health-policy decisions, regardless of their liberal, conservative or populist positioning and 
the relatively high or low impact of COVID-19.  
Of course, there have been some variations in the responses: during the early days of the pandemic, 
Boris Johnson claimed to be in favour to herd immunity in the UK; Spain, Italy, and France 
experienced a strict lockdown; while Germany, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary had lighter 
forms of movement restrictions and control. These differences, however, have been more a matter of 
 
 
variations by degrees than of the nature of the measures taken. Everywhere, the health emergency has 
been the highest priority of the state, allowing the adoption of exceptional temporary measures (such 
as state of emergency). Only several weeks after the outbreak in Wuhan and its appearance in Europe, 
it was realized that warnings from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDPC) had to be taken seriously. Each government thus 
appointed a scientific and medical committee upon which to rely for the most important decisions. In 
the same vein, the Europeanisation of the crisis has also meant that the timetable for policy decisions 
has been fairly similar between countries. Because the pandemic arrived there some weeks earlier 
than elsewhere, Italy showed other European countries how to act, allowing them to structure their 
health-policy solutions accordingly. Nevertheless, despite this Europeanisation of the crisis, 
responses were not coordinated at the EU level. On the contrary, they can be more clearly interpreted 
in the light of the political balance of each country. 
While crises can usually serve as a window of opportunity for populist parties to maintain a high 
degree of polarization in debates and crisis-handling action (Moffit, 2015), the COVID-19 pandemic 
generated a completely different and new context. The suddenness of this external crisis has produced 
different outcomes for populists depending on whether they are in power or in opposition. In general, 
populist parties in power have exploited this critical situation to foster their political centrality and 
legitimacy. M5S in Italy, Podemos in Spain, PiS in Poland, Fidesz in Hungary and ANO in the Czech 
Republic saw this as an opportunity to show their ability to take care of the people even during a 
pandemic. In countries where populists are firmly in power and the COVID-19 impact has been low 
(Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic), populist leaders have used the rhetoric of the outstanding 
leader who 'provides direction' to his people (Weyland, 2017) through the evocation of threat and 
reassurance (Edelman, 1977). On the contrary, where populist parties are in a coalition government 
(i.e. PODEMOS and M5S), populist stances have been softened by governmental solidarity and the 
necessity to justify these extraordinary decisions. In other words, in contrast to the evidence that 
emerged previously (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015; Pappas, 2019), the strategy of populists in 
power has been quite the reverse of that adopted in normal situations: forced to deal with a non-
controversial issue, they have tried to depoliticize the issue and to reduce the level of polarization 
around it. 
For populist parties in opposition, the use of their classical tactics during the pandemic crisis has been 
certainly complicated. Since the crisis has pervaded every aspect of public and private life, to 'perform 
and spread a sense of crisis' (Moffitt, 2015) has been virtually impossible. The main strategy that has 
generally succeeded has been an insistence on the need to overcome the health crisis by the nation as 
a whole. The emergence and success of divisive and polarizing counter-arguments have not only been 
difficult to achieve but also potentially damaging in terms of image and reputation for populist parties. 
This explains why, with a few exceptions (i.e. the Brexit Party criticizing the lockdown), all the 
opposition populist parties included in this studied voted for the emergency measures during phase 
2. Hindered by the discourse of national unity that could have made their criticisms perceived as 
inappropriate, French populists, for example, were forced to shift the focus of their critique using the 
most legitimate political tool at their disposal: legislative activities at a time when parliament was in 
semi-lockdown.  
Only after several weeks and the mitigation of the contagion (phase 3) were populist parties able to 
get back to their key arguments, especially those against the national and supranational elite as well 
as migrants. The crisis has led to the radicalization of discourse for the Brexit Party, Vox and 
Konfederacja, acting as a trigger for a more intense campaign against the ‘enemies of the people’. 
The AfD, instead, has been hindered by more radical stances of the extra-parliamentary opposition 
(APO). Finally, in other countries – like Italy, France or the SPD in the Czech Republic – populist 
parties in opposition have resumed their classical stances, updating their discursive repertoire to the 




To sum up, it is hard to identify a single populist pattern during the pandemic. In general it seems 
that the populists have not substantially benefited, nor substantially lost out, from the COVID-19 
crisis: governing populist parties have maintained or slightly increased their centrality and public 
support, whereas opposition parties have remained stable or have seen their positions slightly worsen. 
A possible explanation is that policy options converged towards a few shared solutions, especially in 
phases 1 and 2. This means that populist and non-populist parties have often voted together, despite 
the rhetoric from both sides describing the two types of party as irreconcilable. The need to overcome 
the crisis appears, therefore, to have left the situation apparently unchanged in the short term. 
However, it might be worth exploring what will happen in the medium term. Although, as mentioned 
earlier, in phase 3 some populist actors returned to their pre-crisis rhetoric, the COVID-19 pandemic 
has introduced two new elements that could point to certain consequences in the coming months. On 
the one hand, it has shown that populist parties, far from being a democratic aberration, are political 
actors in all respects that can contribute to finding solutions and implementing policies. On the other 
hand, it has also shown that the post-COVID-19 age could offer new opportunities in terms of 
alliances and policy repositioning – such as the role of science or strengthening the health system – 
between populist and non-populist parties. 
 
Table 10.1 The consequences of the COVID-19 crisis on populist parties’ performance  
COVID-19 impact Populists’ role Crisis consequences 
UK High Brexit Party: in opposition Decreasing political relevance 
and support in the polls 
Spain High Podemos: in power  Stable institutional relevance 
and decreasing support in the 
polls and in local elections 
Vox: in opposition Increasing institutional 
relevance and increasing support 
in the polls and in local elections 
Italy High M5S: in power  Increasing institutional 
relevance and stable support in 
the polls 
Lega: in opposition Decreasing political relevance 
and support in the polls 
France High RN: in opposition Stable institutional relevance 
and support in the polls and in 
local elections 
LFI: in opposition Stable institutional relevance 
and decreasing support during 
the local elections 
Germany Medium AfD: in opposition Stable institutional relevance 
and support in the polls. 
Hungary Medium Fidesz: in power Stable and high levels of public 
support and political centrality 
Poland Low PiS: in power  Stable institutional relevance 
and slight decrease in support in 
the Presidential elections 
Konfederacja: in 
opposition 
Stable institutional relevance 
and public support 
Czech 
Republic 
Low ANO: in power Stable and high levels of public 
support and political centrality 
KSČM: external support 
 
 
SPD: in opposition Stable levels of public support 




2. The changing relevance of the key elements of populism in the light of (de)politicization of 
the COVID-19 issue 
While populists have not really benefited from the crisis, they have had to face it like all the other 
political players and adapt their discourse to this unprecedented situation, outside the usual 
framework of political competition. In particular, as already mentioned, COVID-19 initially had the 
effect of restraining any form of radical opposition to the policy responses to be implemented, at least 
in the European Union. During the first month of the crisis, with very few exceptions (i.e. some claims 
by the Brexit Party, the AfD and the Lega), the pandemic was not a subject of political confrontation. 
Other ‘normal’ issues were at stake within national debates, including, for example, strikes and local 
elections in France. Suddenly, from the beginning of the confrontation phase onwards (end of 
February-beginning of March), COVID-19 became the overwhelming subject, crowding out all other 
issues at stake on the EU and national political agenda. The general opinion – both public and political 
– was consensual: there is an urgent need to act to protect the population from the pandemic. 
One of the aims of this book was to identify how populists have adapted their discourse to the 
pandemic crisis (RQ1a). As regards the action of naming (Felstiner, Abel & Sarat, 1981), all the 
political actors (both populist and otherwise, in power or in opposition) moved rapidly from 
minimising the problem as a minor form of flu or a Chinese disease to admitting the seriousness of 
the health emergency, without any other form of intermediate categorisation. No symbolic struggle 
or political opposition to its naming was noted from March to June: the COVID-19 pandemic was 
recognized in all countries and by all main political parties as a scientific challenge and a relevant 
issue to be solved. 
As a result of the urgency of finding a response, it is noteworthy that both blaming and claiming 
actions have been concomitant, and quite fluctuating (Katsambekis & Stavrakakis, 2020). Prevented 
from using the appeal to the people as an original and effective argument, during the confrontation 
and managing phases, populists emphasized the other two key elements – anti-elitism and 
exclusionism. Depending on the national political game, criticism of a slow and uncoordinated EU-
elite responsiveness has taken different forms: in the United Kingdom, for example, Nigel Farage 
saw the crisis as an opportunity to call for a no-deal Brexit; in Italy, meanwhile, after years of 
austerity, the arguments were framed around the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) blamed as a 
tool used to limit the economic autonomy of the country. Not all anti-elite claims are, however, 
necessarily specific to populists. There can be much more wide-ranging issues at stake at the national 
level. For instance, criticism of the unpreparedness of the French government was endorsed by the 
entire political and media spectrum; similarly, worries about European austerity measures are widely 
shared in Italy. A second blaming theme concerned the handling of migration issues. While in the 
UK, Germany, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Spain this included the request to close 
borders to reduce the risk of contagion from abroad, in France and Italy the two right-wing populist 
leaders, Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini, accused governments of taking care of migrants instead 
of focusing only on nationals.  
This book also found evidence that right-wing and left-wing populist parties have reacted in a very 
different way to the challenge of the COVID-19 crisis. On the one hand, right-wing populism has 
identified new lines of conflict: an intensification of the emphasis on nationalism (and neo-natalism), 
and the (resulting) opposition of ‘we, the national people’, not only against the EU but also against 
the other member states. These findings confirm that right-wing populism and Euroscepticism are 
reinforcing each other (Conti 2018; Rooduijn & van Kessel 2019). On the other hand, it is evident 
that left-wing parties (Podemos, LFI, and to a certain extent M5S) are not using this kind of discourse. 
 
 
During the crisis, they were more focused on denouncing the lack of public investment in the national 
health-care system and the disastrous consequences of years of EU neoliberalism. 
Country-specific chapters also offer relevant findings regarding the politicization of COVID-19 
issues by populist parties (RQ1b). Similarly to Euroscepticism (Sitter, 2001; Hubé, 2013), the way 
populists in power and populists in opposition have faced COVID-19 emphasizes the importance of 
the institutional role in party behaviour (RQ2). Being (or not being) in power structures partisan 
discourse. Politicization strategies may be placed on a continuum line ranging from complete 
politicization to complete depoliticization, structured around the party’s position in the national 
institutional framework. The combination of politicization line with left-right positioning provides a 
relational map of the different arguments and reactions of populists in the eight countries analysed 
(figure 10.1)63. 
On the one hand, opposition parties tried to politicize the pandemic, but they only partly succeeded, 
in phase 3, mainly focusing on the management of the pandemic and blaming the ruling parties. No 
populist party has attempted to politicize the pandemic outbreak as, for example, Donald Trump did 
by questioning the origin of the virus. The institutional position has seemed to play a major role in 
this politicization process. The most marginal parties (i.e. the Brexit Party, Vox, AfD and 
Konfederacja) have clearly radicalized their discourse based on nationalist, protectionist and neo-
natalist agendas. The opposition parties aspiring to govern – such as RN, LFI and Lega – have been 
much more cautious, mainly focusing on alleged governmental incompetence. 
On the other hand, governmental parties have tried to depoliticize the crisis using technical and 
scientific arguments, following the recommendations of national experts. For them, the crisis has 
been an excellent chance to show their political competence, managerial abilities and dedication to 
the people. The most typical case here is undoubtedly the Czech Republic, whose Prime Minister, 
Andrej Babiš, has stressed his ability to govern the country in this situation as successfully as he 
managed his companies in the past. Again, a difference seems to emerge between left-wing and right-
wing populists in power. Podemos in Spain and M5S in Italy, as members of coalition governments, 
have based their political action on the advice of the technical-scientific committee, denouncing the 
need for more public investment in health-care. At the opposite end of the spectrum, right-wing 
populists in power in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have mainly used scientific arguments 
to justify their political decisions, emphasizing their leader’s ability to make informed decisions 
solely on the basis of the authority of their political leadership. 
A clear pattern of politicization of the COVID-19 crisis by populist political parties in Europe can 
thus be observed. The institutional position of the party in the national political game affects the way 
populists have addressed the issues, ranging from mitigation of populist discourse (populists in 
power) to its dramatization (populists in opposition). 
 
 
Figure 10.1 Map of European populist discourse faced with the COVID-19 crisis  
 






It is worth noting that this pattern based on the institutional role works for the cases analysed here but 
does not include a further situation that everyone has heard of: some leaders in power have rejected 
the scientific evidence on the virus and have used the dispute between politicians and scientists to 
justify political decisions (Katsambekis & Stavrakakis, 2020). Aside from some initial (and careless) 
statements by Boris Johnson and some comments between Farage and Trump, in the EU this kind of 
populist governmental style seems to be absent. It is also somewhat surprising that no leaders 
analysed here have given credit to or supported the conspiracy theories that are usually an integral 
part of populist strategy (Bergmann, 2018). In France, the debate around the chloroquine (HCQ) issue 
could have been endorsed by populist leaders, while in fact all the main French political actors 
distanced themselves from this scientific controversy when the debate became too sticky. Similarly, 
in Italy, both M5S and Lega – close to the No-Vax movement in recent years – have not argued 
against big pharma companies or stirred any controversy against the scientific world. The number of 
intensive care patients and the death toll has likely discouraged European populist leaders from 
resorting to this kind of argumentation. 
 
 
3. Crises as a catalyst for change, populists as entrepreneurs of crises 
The literature has interpreted crises as opportunities for change (see chapter 1). A crisis occurs when 
systemic contradictions are politically exploited and publicly perceived as such (Hay, 1999). 
Populists are generally considered to benefit from a crisis: they play an active role as crisis facilitators 
by pushing problematic situations towards a crisis at both the political and communicative levels 
(Moffitt, 2015). The success of populism is then often interpreted as the result of an external crisis 
(economic, financial, political, migrant, traditional values), questioning the problem-solving 
rationality with respect to a certain issue. Populists take advantage of this fuzziness to propose their 
clear and popular policy solutions. This general pattern seems not to work when applied to the 
COVID-19 crisis. As already mentioned, the peculiar nature of the crisis, as well as the 
implementation of similar policy solutions across all the European states, has virtually prevented 
populists from gaining centrality in the political field and support from public opinion. 
Nevertheless, slightly broadening the analytical perspective and taking into account the relational 
approach through which parties position themselves in the national political field (Bourdieu, 1991), 
it is noticeable that all populist actors acted as ‘crisis entrepreneurs’, that is, as someone who 
 
 
identifies, denounces and claims to be the solver of one or more systemic contradictions. As they 
have been unable to exploit the COVID-19 issue – or able to do so to a limited extent – the populists 
analysed in this book have focused their actions on the new contradictions emerging from the crisis 
situation, such as the role of the EU in managing the health problem and the economic recovery plan; 
the opposition of interests between European states; the unresolved issue of migrant arrivals. 
Evidence suggests that populists – in power or in opposition – benefit more from a situation of 
continual complaint against new contradictions than from the actual outbreak of a crisis (i.e. COVID-
19) or, worse still, from a solution to it (i.e. Brexit for the UKIP). In fact, populists are crisis 
entrepreneurs who strive to fuel a permanent crisis cycle. This is, in fact, the condition that allows 
them to take full advantage of crises in terms of political centrality and voter support. Of course, as 
already mentioned, not all crises are the same. Populists take ownership of the contradictions that 
best suit their Manichean view of society. The quest for this crisis ownership is what feeds the 
continuous process of naming, blaming, claiming of systemic contradictions that populists implement 
as a political strategy. 
Figure 10.2 summarizes the permanent crisis cycle fuelled by populists. In a usual situation, the 
pattern begins with the emergence, triggered by populists, of a political contradiction (1), which 
becomes publicly recognized as a relevant problem (2) and is exploited by populists (3), who push it 
towards an actual crisis (4). Populists do not focus on one contradiction at a time; on the contrary, 
they trigger this cycle for all the contradictions they see at a given time. Points 1 to 3 are the moments 
when populists can benefit the most from the crisis situation, while in point 4, the climax, the 
contradiction finds a solution or a compromise that weakens the issue. 
In external shocks, such as the pandemic outbreak, all political actors suddenly found themselves in 
point 4, where a crisis had broken out and a solution had to be found. This is the worst condition for 
populists because citizens perceive problems as real or experience them directly, and so political 
responses must be rapidly implemented. At these critical junctures, disputes and polarization often 
leave room for forms of political collaboration or non-hostile, tacit agreement in the name of national 
solidarity. However, as soon as this state of emergency ends, populists begin to implement the 
permanent crisis strategy again, fostering the emergence of new contradictions (point 1). This is 
exactly what happened in the eight countries analysed in this book between March and June. 
 


























In our view, therefore, crises per se do not necessarily benefit populism. It is populists, instead, who 
fuel a ‘permanent crisis cycle’ consisting of a continuous quest for ‘crisis ownership’ around stable 
or emerging political contradictions. The COVID-19 pandemic is an interesting case for which 
populists have been unable to achieve this kind of ownership, at least so far. 
The health crisis, however, is anything but over, nor under control. On the contrary, after a 
relatively quiet summer, the second wave of the outbreak seems to be worse than the previous one.  
For a few months now, COVID-19 has moved into policy routine and governments are oscillating 
between economic, public health, and preventive policy measures. In the coming months, the 
COVID-19 crisis will be then ‘normalized’, becoming the new standard situation in which political 
struggle will occur and the people will have to live. This normalization of the COVID-19 crisis will 
probably offer to the opposition parties greater opportunities to politicize the policies implemented 
by governments and possibly to benefit from the crisis.  
However, the factors involved are so numerous - i.e. the actual harshness of the second wave, the 
economic implications, the discovery of an effective vaccine or medicine - that it is not possible 
today to outline reliable future scenarios. What we do know however is that a political challenge 
will be played between the parties in power – that risk being worn by the health crisis – and the 
opposition parties – that could take advantage of the inevitable discontents that the pandemic is 
generating. Populists in power and in opposition, therefore, will have to face opposite challenges, 
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